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Parallelizable MACs Based on the Sum of PRPs with Security Beyond the Birthday Bound
authentication provable security permutation
2019/4/28
The combination of universal hashing and encryption is a fundamental paradigm for the construction of symmetric-key MACs, dating back to the seminal works by Wegman and Carter, Shoup, and Bernstein. W...
Cryptographic implementations on embedded systems need to be protected against physical attacks. Today, this means that apart from incorporating countermeasures against side-channel analysis, implemen...
Generic Attacks against Beyond-Birthday-Bound MACs
Modes of operation Cryptanalysis Message Authentication Codes
2018/6/5
In this work, we study the security of several recent MAC constructions with provable security beyond the birthday bound. We consider block-cipher based constructions with a double-block internal stat...
Optimal Forgeries Against Polynomial-Based MACs and GCM
forgery Wegman-Carter authenticator
2018/3/6
Polynomial-based authentication algorithms, such as GCM and Poly1305, have seen widespread adoption in practice. Due to their importance, a significant amount of attention has been given to understand...
Blockcipher-based MACs: Beyond the Birthday Bound without Message Length
MAC, blockcipher, PRF
2017/9/13
We present blockcipher-based MACs (Message Authentication Codes) that have beyond the birthday bound security without message length in the sense of PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) security. Achieving su...
Message-Recovery MACs and Verification-Unskippable AE
message recovery MACs authenticated encryption unskippability
2017/3/27
This paper explores a new type of MACs called message-recovery MACs (MRMACs). MRMACs have an additional input RR that gets recovered upon verification. Receivers must execute verification in order to ...
Impact of ANSI X9.24-1:2009 Key Check Value on ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 MACs
ANSI X9.24-1:2009 key check value ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011
2016/1/25
ANSI X9.24-1:2009 specifies the key check value, which is used to verify the integrity
of the blockcipher key. This value is defined as the most significant bits of the ciphertext of the zero
block,...
Generic Universal Forgery Attack on Iterative Hash-based MACs
HMAC NMAC hash function universal forgery
2016/1/9
In this article, we study the security of iterative hash-based MACs, such as HMAC
or NMAC, with regards to universal forgery attacks. Leveraging recent advances in the analysis
of functional graphs ...
In this paper we study the security of hash-based MAC algorithms (such as HMAC and NMAC) above the birthday bound. Up to the birthday bound, HMAC and NMAC are proven to be secure under reasonable assu...
The security of HMAC (and more general hash-based MACs) against state-recovery and universal forgery attacks was very recently shown to be suboptimal, following a series of surprising results by Leure...
Faster Binary-Field Multiplication and Faster Binary-Field MACs
Performance FFTs Polynomial multiplication
2016/1/7
This paper shows how to securely authenticate messages using
just 29 bit operations per authenticated bit, plus a constant overhead
per message. The authenticator is a standard type of “universal” h...
Practical Homomorphic MACs for Arithmetic Circuits
message authentication codes homomorphic authenticators secure outsourcing
2016/1/3
Homomorphic message authenticators allow the holder of a (public) evaluation key to
perform computations over previously authenticated data, in such a way that the produced tag σ can
be used to cert...
Generalizing Homomorphic MACs for Arithmetic Circuits
Homomorphic Message Authentication Codes Secure Outsourcing Verifiable Computation
2015/12/31
Homomorphic MACs, introduced by Gennaro and Wichs in
2013, allow anyone to validate computations on authenticated data without
knowledge of the secret key. Moreover, the secret-key owner can verify
...
Homomorphic MACs: MAC-Based Integrity for Network Coding
Network Coding MAC-Based Integrity
2015/8/5
Network coding has been shown to improve the capacity and robustness in networks. However, since intermediate nodes modify packets en-route, integrity of data cannot be checked using traditional MACs ...
DETAILED AND HIGHLY ACCURATE 3D MODELS OF HIGH MOUNTAIN AREAS BY THE MACS-HIMALAYA AERIAL CAMERA PLATFORM
3D Model Himalaya MACS
2015/5/7
Remote sensing in areas with extreme altitude differences is particularly challenging. In high mountain areas specifically, steep slopes result in reduced ground pixel resolution and degraded qualit...